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A CORPORATE PALEONTOLOGIST'S LOOK AT LAW AND
ECONOMICS IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS

I.

M. BRANSON*

DISCLAIMERS

I am a corporate law "liberal"-a populist who believes in shareholder rights and who is distrustful of aggregations of economic power
anywhere, but especially in the hands of corporate managers. Few of us
"liberals" remain. Law and economics and the so-called nexus of contracts approach to corporation law statutes have enveloped us, rendering
us obsolete. 1
I, therefore, have come to regard myself as a corporate paleontologist. I examine fossils such as the corporate law duty of care or the derivative action, holding them up for closer examination, occasionally
lamenting their demise. 2 I then return them carefully to a shelf in the
corporation law wing of some Field Museum of Natural History which
houses fossils from that day upon the earth when we still had something
known as corporate law.
A second disclaimer everyone must make is to recognize the unarguable contribution that economic analysis has made to corporate law. Law
and economics has swept the academic corporate law area like prairie
fire. Economic analysis of law has informed, if not controlled, both judicial and legislative developments as well. 3 No respectable academic can
remain unaware of the contributions of Dean Henry Manne, or Professor
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A., 1965, University of Notre Dame; J.D.,
1970, Northwestern University; LL.M., 1974, University of Virginia.
1. See, e.g., the arguments for retention of some substantive content in corporate law statutes
in Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British
Company Law Reform, and Principlesof Corporate Governanceand Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53,
72-88 (1983). Mainstream academic thought quickly rendered those arguments anachronistic. See,
e.g., ContractualFreedom in CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). But see Bratton, The
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Branson, The American Law Institute Principlesof CorporateGovernance and the
Derivative Action: A View From the Other Side, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399 (1986); Branson,
Assault on Another Citadel:Attempts to Curtailthe FiduciaryStandardApplicable to CorporateDirectors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988).
3. For example, the auction model of target company directors' response to takeover bids,
adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), traces its roots to an academic debate a few years previous and dominated
by L&E scholars, including then Professor Easterbrook and Professor Dan Fischel. See Easterbrook
& Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982).
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Daniel Fischel, or Professors turned Judges Posner and Easterbrook. The
market for corporate control, the passivity thesis, agency cost theory,
and the efficient market hypothesis either are the inventions of these
scholars or have been presented to us in new and useful ways by their
writings.
II.

INTRODUCTION

That said and done, I proceed to an analysis of Professors Honabach
and Dennis's article.4 The authors' examination of five Seventh Circuit
opinions demonstrates all that is wrong with economic analysis today
and hints at all the mischief overuse of these models and this mode of
analysis is about to cause. That is not to say that Professors Honabach
and Dennis adhere to all the extreme implications that law and economics is producing for our time. They present the full panoply of L&E analysis and models, and, although they come perilously close to the brink at
times, they pull back and do not sign on to all the malarkey L&E now
seems to be producing.
In short, I intend to use my colleagues Dennis Honabach and Roger
Dennis's article as a takeoff point for a demonstration of what is wrong
with law and economics, at least in its present day application to corporate law, and not specifically what is wrong with their article.
I group my comments under three banners. First is overuse of, or
overaggregation of phenomenon under, now shopworn L&E principles
or models.5 Second is a certain hypocrisy and falsity that has begun to
creep into economic analysis, leading scholars to play up fundamental
tenets when their thesis is thereby advanced, but to ignore them altogether when the building block concepts contradict their desired conclusion. Third, and most damning, is the overwhelmingly apologist flavor of
law and economics scholarship. That scholarship now seems totally outcome oriented. The outcome to be arrived at, and to justify, is what managers of Fortune 500 corporations want, whether it be the death of the
derivative action, de facto elimination of the duty of care, or upholding
management entrenchment devices such as the device euphemistically
known as "dual class capitalization" or the more aptly named poison
pill. In Professors Honabach and Dennis's piece, abolition of any remaining semblance of common law fiduciary duties and upholding of state
4. Honabach & Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control, 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 681 (1990).

5. Professor Jack Coffee has referred to "overaggregated" perspectives, many emanating from
law and economics. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment
of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1984).
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antitakeover statutes that insulate managers from all real accountability
are ends that would appease corporate powers greatly.
III.

OVERUSE AND OVERAGGREGATION

Economic analysis might intimate that ideas and concepts reach
points beyond which their marginal utility begins to decline. 6 Law and
economics scholars, however, have not yet begun to realize that with
equal force this tenet of declining marginal utility applies to their mode
of analysis. Every L&E concept is pushed to and beyond its usefulness,
beyond marginal utility or any utility at all. The interest group model for
legislation, the efficient market hypothesis, portfolio diversification, the
market for corporate control, agency cost theory, and other L&E constructs are valuable tools. But today they are stretched to and beyond
their breaking points. More phenomena are grouped under each than
common sense or logic can justify.
For example, since markets are efficient, one leading law and economics scholar has suggested that all securities analysts should be required to throw their briefcases in the Hudson River and find new lines
of work. 7 An early law and economics Stanford Law Review piece recommended that, based upon the efficient market hypothesis, all securities
research should carry a cautionary label, not unlike packs of cigarettes.8
These overuse-overaggregation errors result from the failure to realize
that the market may be efficient only on average or with respect to actively traded securities. Because of this, investors and analysts continue
to seek out undervalued stocks, and since market efficiency is a self-referential concept, the minute the analysts throw their briefcases away and
quit analysis the market will cease being efficient.
Professors Honabach and Dennis fall into the overaggregation error
with their view of the market for corporate control:
Direct monitoring of managerial behavior and judicial enforcement of
fiduciary duties is costly and imperfect. Fortunately, for the shareholders in publicly held corporations, the market for control is a much
more effective, efficient tool .... Share-holders who couple [the protection of the market for corporate control] with appropriate diversification of their portfolio minimize the cost of managerial behavior.9
With that as raw material, they then extract from the dicta in the CTS
6. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICs 408-09 (11th ed. 1980); R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER,
ECONOMICS 133-35 (3d ed. 1972).
7. See N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION 110 (1984).
8. Comment, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1977).
9. Honabach & Dennis, supra note 4, at 691-92 (footnote omitted).
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decisions the theories of a hypothetical Judge Posner. Hypothetical Posner would eliminate application of the common law of fiduciary duty,
save for cases that would have been violations of the duty of loyalty, and
therefore, might affect the market for corporate control. "[C]hallenges to
managerial decisions which do not threaten to displace the market for
corporate control" would be given short shrift, notwithstanding the presence of self-dealing. 10 By contrast, "challenges to any managerial acts
which affect the market for control" would be carefully reviewed to determine whether the affect is too great to be acceptable,'1 presumably
using something resembling traditional fiduciary duty analysis.
The above discussion presents no fewer than three overaggregation
errors. First is the reliance upon diversification as a safety net to protect
shareholders when market forces fail. This is the standard L&E fallback
argument for elimination of all legal controls on corporate managers. If
the market for corporate control fails to protect shareholders of a particular company from management wrongdoing, those shareholders could
have minimized, if not avoided altogether, the impact upon their eco2
nomic well-being by having had diversified portfolios.1
But what if some investors are not diversified? Must they bear the
full brunt of a market failure? If of any number, they deserve protection.
The law should have in place some substantive rights and remedies to
protect them. As a judge charged with doing justice or equity in individual cases, Judge Posner may be encountering the reality of what laws are
for and what judges do. Hence, in his opinions one does find "a curious
3
blend of traditional and sometimes incomplete economic analysis"'
which Professors Honabach and Dennis lament.
Nondiversification may also serve other laudable goals. Firm-specific investment by employee-shareholders, members of local communities, or investors serves to promote loyalty to the enterprise that a
corporation represents.' 4 In addition, the under-diversified shareholder
10. Id. at 713.
ll. Id.

12. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 713
(1982) ("the existence of diversification-not its employment--supports our argument"); Fischel,
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1268 n.27 (1982) ("the option of
diversification, an option available to every investor, greatly minimizes investors' concern with financial collapse").
13. Honabach & Dennis, supra note 4, at 742.
14. The limited studies available demonstrate that because of other values associated with their
shareholdings many investors such as senior managers tend significantly to be under-diversified. See,
e.g., Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 387-90
(1983).
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often is an additional monitor.' 5 In fact, the paradigm may be the underdiversified/ monitor-shareholder turned aggressor who makes the market
for corporate control work. Consistently, however, the fallback justification for elimination of this or that legal control is that diversification, and
not legal controls, should be the shareholders' second line of defense
against managerial misbehavior.
The front line defense, the market for corporate control, no doubt
exists and functions well, at least at the Fortune 1000 level. The market
for corporate control bases itself in turn on market efficiency. It depends
upon share prices reflecting with some accuracy the inefficient or opportunistic behavior occurring within a company. But market efficiency attenuates dramatically even with respect to less actively traded New York
Stock Exchange listed stocks.16 Market efficiency cannot be said to exist
in many nooks and crannies of the over-the-counter market in which
12,000-14,000 companies' shares sometimes trade. Yet, at the urging of
law and economics scholars, the entire face of corporate law is to be
changed based upon the market efficiency that exists and functions only
with respect to a small minority of corporations. That is overaggregation
error number two.
In part because market efficiency attenuates, the market for corporate control is at best only a rough-hewn tool. Long before share prices
fall sufficiently to justify acquisitions by a potential aggressor, managerial
behavior of shocking proportions can occur. A Victor Posner can milk
public companies dry over twenty years or more and the market for corporate control would never reach him or the misconduct.' 7 Even at the
Fortune 500 level, an F. Ross Johnson can assemble the RJR Nabisco
Air Force and strings of condominiums and homes at corporate expense,
and move an entire corporate headquarters at vast expense, solely on a
whim, like some corrupt potentate in colonial India.i8 The market for
corporate control either never reaches the misconduct or does so only
very gradually. The market for corporate control works imperfectly or
slowly, and does not reach at all into even some middle rungs of the
corporate ladder. To treat it as a universal construct, as do Professors
15.

Economists seem to recognize this. See, e.g., Amihud & Lev, Risk Reduction as a Manage-

rial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981).

16. See, e.g., Gordon & Korhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770-96 (1985); Wang, Some Arguments that the Market is not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 376-77 (1986).
17. See Allen, PosnerAgrees to Formation of a Panelon Pay, Transactions Within His Empire,
Wall St. J., June 30, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
18. See B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABISCO 94-95 (1990).
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Honabach and Dennis as well as other L&E scholars, is overaggregation
error number three.
Removing the protection of fiduciary duty leaves a great gap between managerial misbehavior and the market for corporate control, in
which no deterrent would exist (assuming that the market for corporate
control operates somewhat efficiently in that sector of the markets in
which the particular corporation is situated). That gap represents a
moral hazard of proportions yet unseen in our jurisprudence. No method
would exist whereby shareholders could challenge perquisites and selfdealing, short of acquiring the company themselves or waging a proxy
fight to oust the self-dealing managers. Such a state of affairs would be
morally reprehensible to most individuals in our society. The distributional aspect, permitting the wealthiest sector of the population to become even wealthier through self-dealing at others' expense, would be
politically unpalatable. Last of all, the whole concept might be bad economics. Necessary capital formation would be impeded to a great degree
by the moral revulsion and political dissatisfaction the new scheme
engenders.
I am not sure that Judge Posner, aware as he is of the judge's role in
individual cases, would sign on to the economic analysis viewpoint that
Professors Honabach and Dennis attempt to ascribe to him. If he did,
however, I would caution him on the errors of overaggregation and the
creation of an universal legal model that works tolerably well only at the
upper reaches of the corporate sphere.
IV.

L&E

CONCEPTS AS PLAYDOUGH

Overall, law and economics used to opine that common-law adjudication was efficient.' 9 Courts are markets in which supply and demand
forces interact. Over time this marketplace of ideas produces a legal
scheme that nicely balances the doing of fairness and equity in individual
cases with the goal of economic efficiency or other broad public policy
goals.20
19. See generally Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 627-33 (1980) (so-called evolutionary efficiency of the common-law method);
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977).
See also Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 780 (1981) (positive theory of efficiency as policy guide for gap filling in
common-law adjudications).
20. In the fiduciary duty area, in their most recent writing, Judge Easterbrook and Professor
Fischel actually have concluded that fiduciary duty is a mechanism for relatively efficient "forms of
subsequent settling up" that have evolved "[o]ver tens of years and thousands of firms." Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1420-21 (1989). Ex ante fiduciary
duty is an inexpensive deterrent to managerial conduct that may be harmful:
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Occasionally, market failures occur. Tugged into doing so by their
heartstrings, caught up in the severity of the harm that has occurred, or
propelled by their emotions, judges err on the side of fairness, or their
view of it, in an individual case at the expense of efficiency. Yet those
"knee jerk" reactions are relatively rare. Stare decisis, res judicata, appellate courts, and a whole variety of institutional and other factors constrain judges. 2 1 Over time, "knee jerks" fall by the wayside and layer
upon layer, the common law builds fairly efficiently in a marketplace of
ideas and arguments.
22
By contrast, the legislature is the forum in which Art of the Deal
might be required reading. Subject to the glare of publicity and the need
to be re-elected, legislators are the government officials far more likely to
produce a "knee jerk" reaction to some case of serious injury or obvious
inequity. In other matters, legislation introduced by an authoritative
source such as a major corporate citizen or a bar association committee
can go from germination to the governor's desk with little scrutiny. If
proponents meet with failure in a current legislative session, no bar such
as res judicata prevents them from pursuing a legislative goal again and
again. Neither stare decisis nor Lochner v. New York's 2 3 substantive appellate review exists.
We are now told, according to doctrinaire L&E analysis (and not
necessarily Professors Honabach and Dennis), 24 that all of this has
changed. Courts are now bad and legislatures are good. In this area,
'25
courts apply "notoriously nebulous concepts" such as "fairness."
Parenthetically, one can note that it was legislatures, beginning with California in the late 1930s, and not courts, that made fairness the touchThe expensive legal system is not cranked up unless there is evidence of wrongdoing; if the
anticipated penalty (the sanction multiplied by the probability of its application) is selected
well, there will not be much wrongdoing, and the costs of the system are correspondingly
small.
Id. at 1421.
21. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 36-41 (1986), and elsewhere, gives a good description of the
many forces constraining judges' apparent freedom to act as they wish.
22. D. TRUMP, THE ART OF THE DEAL (1987). See also D. TRUMP, SURVIVING AT THE Top

(1990).
23. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), substantially restricted by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
24. See, e.g., Honabach & Dennis, supra note 4, at 733, differentiating between legislative design of efficient corporate law rules and legislative design of antitakeover statutes:
The benefits derived from competition among states for corporate charters in large part
depend on the market for control. To the extent that legislation like the Indiana control
share statute insulates managers from the market for control, they need be less sensitive to
shareholder interests when choosing the state of incorporation. Given the diminished likelihood of a hostile takeover, they need not seek out "superior" corporate rules. Hence,
statutes like Indiana's actually reduce the values of federalism.
25. Honabach & Dennis, supra note 4, at 687.
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26
stone in the corporate law duty of loyalty area.
Judicial intervention is "costly" for corporations and their managers
and therefore must be avoided. 27 When Judge Posner resorts to common
law, he chooses "the alternative of liberating the fiduciary genie from her
bottle."' 28 "The tantalizing, indeed troubling, question is whether he can
ever recapture her."' 29 Common-law fiduciary duty should be eliminated
altogether in favor of contract or invoked only when managers' actions
threaten the workings of the market for corporate control.
Legislatures, on the other hand, are now producers of bargains that
must be upheld. "[T]he law and economics interest group approach...
suggests that much legislation is the product of compromise among competing interest groups."' 30 For example,
[Jiudge Posner subscribes to the interest group/public choice theory of
legislation. He argues that legislation is the product of competition
among interest groups to purchase products from the legislature ....
Judge Posner maintains that the role of the court in statutory interpretation should be to enforce the 3deal reached between the relevant interest groups and the legislature .

Judge Easterbrook's attitude is similar, thus seemingly deserving of
32
praise.
Suddenly, common-law fiduciary duty, the product of courts and a
hundred years or more of supply and demand in a marketplace of ideas,
is bad, while antitakeover statutes, the product of state legislatures, have
become good. Similarly, the market for corporate control and the passivity thesis, which states that law ought to prohibit all defenses to takeovers so that the disciplinary aspect of the market for corporate control
can work its magic, now give way to upholding tinhorn state antitakeover statutes. How did we get here?
V.

THE OVERWHELMING APOLOGIST FLAVOR OF IT ALL

"On the one hand L&E scholars champion managerial discretion
and deference to state legislation. On the other, they are wary of... self26. Corporate lawyers and legislators caused fairness to be added as an alternative test so as to
save some interested director transactions which more hard and fast common law rules would have
made voidable at the corporation's option. See, e.g., Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions:A Watering Down of FiduciaryStandards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
201, 204 n.8 (1977); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22
Bus. LAW. 35, 39-40 (1966).
27. See Honabach & Dennis, supra note 4, at 686-89.
28. Id. at 711.
29. Id.

30. Id. at 725.
31. Id. at 728 (footnote omitted).
32. See id. at 736-38.
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help measures [such as suits based upon breaches of fiduciary duty] intended to undercut the market for corporate control.13 3 Indeed, many
L&E scholars whose work Professors Honabach and Dennis review,
somewhat approvingly, claim to see no difference between the duties of
care and loyalty and would abolish common-law fiduciary duty altogether, except perhaps as a default rule in cases in which parties had not
34
otherwise provided by contract.
To the skeptic, all of this has an overwhelming apologist flavor.
L&E scholars seem duty bound ex post to provide a rationale for everything corporate titans need or want. Their mission seems to require them
to place total credence in averages or medians even if exceptions are great
in number and the potential for individual harm severe. Thus, they berate the traditional work of courts, doing justice in individual cases, in
favor of a broad-based, excessively Darwinian view.
Most elementally, however, they just have it all flat wrong. It begins, as much of law and economics' shortcomings, with an overaggregation error. The proponents of the interest group/public choice analysis
model of legislation group all legislation and legislatures under a model
apparently based on something resembling the United States Congress.3 5
In Congress, perhaps, legislation is the product of competition and bargains struck between special interest groups. The stakes tend to be large.
A number of interest groups compete to have their views embodied in the
legislative product. Scrutiny from congressional staffs and broadcast and
print media give some assurance that at least the worst legislative deals
and bargains do not survive the process.
Part-time state legislatures are altogether a different matter. Even
with legislation as major as state antitakeover legislation, bills can almost
advance or pass the point of passage with no scrutiny or opposition. In a
single committee meeting, weary citizen legislators may deal with topics
as diverse as juvenile justice, workers' compensation, land use legislation,
33. Id. at 743.
34. See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, The Role of LiabilityRules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 290-91 (1986) (distinction
between duty of care and loyalty is "not at all clear" to the authors); Edited Transcript of Proceedings of the Business Roundtable/Emory University Law and Economics Center Conference on Remedies Under the ALI Proposals:Law and Economics, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 368 (1986) (remarks
of Daniel Fischel). These arguments have begun to creep into the promanagement practitioner literature. See, e.g., Block, Radin & Rosenzweig, The Role of the Business Judgement Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAw. 469, 507 (1990) (the "line between the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty is not at all clear" and "more rigorous judicial review is [not]
needed in the context of duty of loyalty cases").
35. See, e.g., Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 51 (1988) (United States Congress used as the only model of the
legislative process).
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and a proposed state antitakeover statute. Two, or perhaps three, committee members will have read the proposed statute. Only one may fully
understand or grasp its import.
In most state legislatures, there are no bargains struck among competing special interest groups. In 9 of 10, or 19 of 20 cases not a single
individual appears to give testimony in opposition to legislation or to
lobby for or wrangle a modification to suit their interest. A bar association committee or a single publicly-held corporation within the state lobbies for and massages the antitakeover statute through the 60 or 90 day
36
annual or even biennial legislative session.
This pattern repeats itself with Boeing Company in Washington
State, Nike in Oregon, Greyhound in Arizona, Dayton Hudson Corp. in
Minnesota, Aetna Insurance in Connecticut, Burlington Industries in
North Carolina, Arvin Corp. in Indiana, and so on. 37 The legislative/
special interest group model L&E scholars have concocted has so little
connection with reality that its value as a predictive or analytical tool is
nil.
What has happened is that corporate titans and lawyers have discovered that the cheapest source of takeover defensive protection is the state
legislative process. Or, more accurately, the cheapest defense in terms of
out-of-pocket cost is a state antitakeover statute. Assuming that a given
amount of defensive protection costs a given amount, the question then
becomes who bears those costs.
The best defense of all for managers might be to own all or most of
the stock themselves. Yet that is the most expensive alternative for them.
Less expensive but similar takeover protection can be obtained through
the leveraged buyout (LBO) in which managers, possibly in partnership
with a LBO firm, put up ten percent of the equity and borrow the remainder needed to purchase the stock. In absolute terms, however, the
out-of-pocket costs for managers are still enormous. Other defensive
measures, such as poison pills or dual class capitalizations, bestow a
36. My personal experience includes 15 years' service on a state bar association corporate law
revision committee that has prepared legislative packages on a biennial basis. I have also had legislative involvement through membership on not-for-profit and limited partnership law revision committees. I have been personally involved with four proposed state antitakeover statutes, on two
occasions testifying before a state senate committee and on one occasion conducting a teach-in on
state antitakeover statutes for a joint special session of the Washington State Senate and House of
Representatives.
37. Professor Roberta Romano, in The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV.
111 (1987), describes and documents this model of statutory adoption at the behest of one dominant
firm within a state.
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given amount of protection for a set cost. It is unclear who bears that
cost.
In terms of the lowest out-of-pocket costs for a given amount of
takeover protection, however, nothing can compare to a state antitakeover statute. All a corporation need do is wrap itself in the state flag, hire
one of the state's large, prestigious law firms and, in the case of a Boeing,
fly to Olympia, or with a Nike, run to Salem. With the protection of an
antitakeover statute, a great amount of protection is obtained for very
little out-of-pocket cost. Who bears the rest of that given cost for a given
amount of takeover protection? Shareholders and our national economy
do. On corporate managers, part, it is self-dealing on a grand scale.
Judge Easterbrook is thus totally amiss in positing that:
[c]ompetition among the states in the long run will cause corporations
to migrate to states with optimum corporate governance rules. Competition will 'grind under' bad state decisions. Court intervention will
disturb that competitive process .... Competition among
38 the states is
the optimum process for revealing the best equilibrium.
In the area of state antitakeover legislation we truly have Mr. Justice
Brandeis's "race not of diligence but of laxity" 39 and Bill Cary's "Race to
the Bottom." 4 For L&E scholars to be advocates of state antitakeover
legislation or of the state legislative processes that produce it doubly underscores the apologist flavor of law and economics in the corporate law
arena. From this point to a corporate law liberal's skepticism of much of
the law and economics teaching in the corporate field needs no
explanation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This diatribe is aimed at party-line law and economics attitudes and
output in the corporate law area. Its criticisms do not apply with full
force to Professor Honabach and Dennis's piece, although their article
does provide starting points and illustrative material for many of the
points made here.
One other area of disagreement I have with my colleagues
Honabach and Dennis is their explanation of why Judges Posner and
Easterbrook do not give full rein to law and economics views in the Seventh Circuit opinions they authored. The judges are constrained by "circuit politics." The judges are limited by the dictates of state law. A
38. Honabach & Dennis, supra note 4, at 740 (footnote omitted).
39. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705
(1974).
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possible explanation comes from the opposite direction. Perhaps the
judges are learning what it is to be judges and how weighty is the mandate to do equity and substantial justice in the individual cases that come
before them.

